Suchergebnisse

In 2016 the "bail-in" tool, set by the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), started to enter into force: shareholders of European banks lose their money in the case of bank rescue. Before the "bail-in" mechanism was introduced, governments often performed bail-out of distressed banks. The larger risk born by shareholders can be observed in the growth of stock market volatility. We implement a panel data analysis on a sample of large European banks and find that in 2016 stock market volatility changes in a way that is theoretically consistent with the introduction of the "bail-in". Moreover, Italy shows an even higher volatility, probably due to retail investors owning bank shares, who could have understood the risk only after the burden sharing of four Italian banks in November 2015. These findings can be a warning about market efficiency, with implications for the systemic risk of a "bail-in" procedure.

This paper is aimed at investigating the effects of government intervention through unemployment benefits on macroeconomic dynamics in an agent-based decentralized matching framework. The major result is that the presence of such a public intervention in the economy stabilizes the aggregate demand and the financial conditions of the system at the cost of a modest increase of both the inflation rate and the ratio between public deficit and nominal GDP. The successful action of the public sector is sustained by the central bank, which is committed to buy outstanding government securities.